

# The expansion of participatory budgeting in Brazil

an analysis of the successful cases based upon design  
and socio-economic indicators

Research Report

Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil  
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# The expansion of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil

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## 1. GENERAL VIEW

Participatory budgeting emerged in Porto Alegre in 1990 and expanded to the rest of Brazil and many other countries in Africa, Europe, Latin America and Asia by the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Avritzer, 2002a; Wampler, 2003; Wampler and Avritzer, 2005; Sintomer, 2005). The expansion of participatory budgeting in Brazil is noteworthy for numerical, political, and regional reasons. Numerically, PB expanded from 13 cases in 1992 to 53 in 1996 to 112 in 2000 to 190 in 2004. Our current research shows that there were 201 cases of PB at the end of 2008. The significant expansion of PB over a twenty-year period means that PB has been adopted in municipalities that are significantly different from Porto Alegre, the municipality with the first PB program. The greater number of PB cases, combined with a careful tracking of PB over the past twenty years now provides us with an incredible opportunity to better understand how factors such as region, municipality size, and political party affect how PB programs function.

The adoption of PB evolved in regional terms as PB expanded out of its original base in South and Southeast of Brazil to the other regions, particularly, the Northeast region (see table 1 below). The expansion of PB poses important research and institutional design questions to policy makers: How does municipality size or region affect PB performance? Which are the important institutional design innovations and continuities? How does variation in the institutional design of internal processes affect PB performance? Finally, how does party governance affect PB performance? There has been a decentering of PB as it is no longer closely tied to the Workers' Party, which lead us to investigate how PB has been adapted to meet local needs.


**Table 1**  
Experiences of P.B. in Brazil

	<b>Total number</b>	<b>% PT</b>
1989-1992	13	92%
1993-1996	53	62%
1997-2000	120	43%
2000-2004	190	59%
2005-2008	201	65%

Source: data collected from the research; Wampler e Avritzer (2005)

The map below shows the spatial distribution of P.B. experiences:

**Figure 1**  
Distribution of 2005-2008 PB experiences



## 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To answer these questions the current project adopted two research strategies. First research on the number of PB cases active during the 2005-2008 mayoral administrative period. This new data was added to an existing database on PB programs that had been active at some point from 1990-2004. In order to identify which Brazilian municipalities adopted PB between 2005-2008, we started with a “most likely case” approach. The research team first contacted all municipalities that used PB between 2001 and 2004 in order to identify if the program had been maintained during the 2005-2008. We already knew that the one of the strongest reasons why a government would have a PB program was whether they had previously adopted a PB program. We also contacted left-of-center municipal governments (PT, PSB, PC do B, PV) because previous research demonstrated that these were more likely to adopt PB. Finally, we also engaged in “snow-balling” techniques in which we sought out information from government officials, NGOs, and civil society organizations regarding other municipalities that had adopted PB.

The second phase of the research project was to apply a questionnaire consisting of 11 questions. This questionnaire tapped into a broad range of issues such as party political, internal organizations, types of participation, etc. The collection of this data on all PB programs builds on earlier work published by Ana Clara Torres Ribeiro and Grazia de Grazia on the 1997-2000 PB programs. But the current project is an advance due to more systematic collection of data by a single research team, which allowed for a more consistent and verifiable body of data collected. This data now provides us with the opportunity to assess the

types of changes associated with PB in Brazil. In addition, the two lead researchers on this project collected basic data on the adoption of PB between 2001 and 2004, although that research project did not collect specific information about each individual case of PB (Wampler and Avritzer 2005).

A key line of questioning in the survey focuses on the administrative and political characteristics that are crucial to how each PB program functions. The main variations identified are: (a) the institutional design of the participatory process that brings citizens into budgetary decision-making; (b) the administrative agency/department that is responsible for the program; and (c) the frequency with which the participatory budgeting process is held.

## **2.1 Institutional Design**

Participatory budgeting emerged in Porto Alegre with a very specific design: assemblies would take place every year, at the regional level (sub-municipal). Based on the results region-level deliberations and voting, two processes ensured that policies were implemented according to the demands of the regional assemblies. A municipal-wide Participatory Budgeting Council would oversee the drafting of the budget and the implementation of the public works would be carried out by the planning department (GAPLAN). A detailed analysis of these institutions shows that they were designed to fit into Porto Alegre's politics. Regional assemblies were designed to fit the participatory logic of the city of Porto Alegre, which was very intense in the beginning of the 1990s. The structure of a council and an administrative agency were

also important for the success of participatory budgeting. The PB council was important to establish a process of debate on budgetary issues outside the government. The regional assemblies were not the place for in-depth discussion on the whole of budget due to the importance of technical issues and also due to the way citizens and CSOs were organized. Many important issues were discussed in the assemblies such as who will get housing or whether the city would need new large avenues, such as the third “perimetral”, the most expensive public work carried out in Porto Alegre during the 90’s.

In addition, GAPLAN (Planning Department) also played an important role in the success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre due to many coordination issues that emerged from the participatory process and needed to be tackled by the administration. Having an administrative body with direct links with the mayor helps to resolve crucial problems in the implementation of P.B. Since the organization of PB in Porto Alegre was based on the political needs of CSOs and government officials, the data collected in the project will allow us to see the extent to which variation in institutional design of these institutions is associated with factors such as municipality size, party governance, region, or wealth.

If we analyze more closely the issue of the timing of the participatory process we see reasons for variation. Porto Alegre’s participatory process has been yearly based. However, the yearly process did not fit completely with the administrative dynamics. Very few public works can be delivered in one year, due to the way the Brazilian public administration works. Bidding processes in Brazil are slow, the administrative process of implementation of public works is also slow.



Though participatory budgeting created a public pressure for more efficiency in both areas (Marquetti, 2003), the fact that it assumed an unrealistic view about the completion of the demands did not help its success. The solution the city of Porto Alegre gave to delays in implementation was to try to finish most of the demands for public works before the electoral period (Santos, 2002). This points out to the importance of variation in timing that is an important consideration when we think about the expansion of participatory budgeting. A more realistic approach to how long does it take to process demands and how not to make excessive demands that governments may not be willing to meet in the short run is important for the success of participatory budgeting.

## **2.2 Administrative Unit Responsible for PB**

A second important variation is of the institution in charge of administering participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting emerged in Porto Alegre and less than one year after its implementation led to the resignation of the planning secretary of the city (Avritzer, 2002b). After this conflict participatory budgeting was relocated to GAPLAN, the planning department directly linked to the mayor. Participatory budgeting creates administrative conflicts and the place where it is located is key to its success or failure. The reason why PB creates administrative conflicts is because the decision of the participatory process always effects several branches of the municipal administration. Two key aspects for the success of participatory budgeting are, the political will of the mayor expressed in full administrative support and the ability of the municipal government to coordinate the emerging

conflict between participatory budgeting and the remaining branches of the administration. Brazilian experience shows many different options of administrative allocation of participatory budgeting. Belo Horizonte placed it in the Planning Department, as did the city of Recife. There are other alternatives such as its allocation in the secretary of government or the creation of a participatory budgeting secretary as the city of Uberlandia did in the late nineties. It is important to evaluate success in relation to where participatory budgeting is allocated when we consider the possibility of expansion of the experiences of participatory budgeting to other countries in Latin America and Africa.

### **2.3 Political Parties**

The last issue that we will approach in this introduction is the relation between political parties and the implementation of participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting emerged as a Workers' Party proposal for the organization of the interaction between state and civil society in the city of Porto Alegre. However, its initial implementation already required supra-party actions. The PDT (Partido Democrático Trabalhista) expressed strong support for participatory budgeting in its initial year (it changed its position later). Civil society association particularly neighborhood associations also expressed strong initial support for PB. The success of participatory budgeting moved it farther from the Workers' Party proposal. The P.S.B. (Partido Socialista Brasileiro) who followed the P.T. administration in Belo Horizonte decided to continue with P.B. At the same time, other left wing administrations already implemented P.B. in between 1997 and the year 2000 (see table 1 above). All these supra-party action showed the

potential of P.B. in becoming a public policy non-dependable on political parties. This is also a key element in its expansion beyond Brazil. In this research we are going to draw in depth into these three issues raised in the introduction: design, location and political links. We expect to be able to show from a variety of experiences what are the potential for a policy of expansion of participatory budgeting.

### **3 CASES OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING 2005-2008: EXPLAINING LONG TERM TRENDS**

The number of cases of PB in Brazil during the 2005-2008 period is 201. This number is nearly the same of cases between 2001 and 2004 (172 according a previous research work and 199 according to our up-to-date data collection). The first important issue to analyze is the distribution of cases according to region and municipal size.

Historically, Brazilian PB cases experiences have been concentrated in the South and Southeast regions as well as in municipalities with more than 100,000 residents. In regard to city size, the first observation is that 41% of the 2005-2008 experiences are located in the cities with more than 100,000 residents and 40 % of all PB cases are located in cities with a population in between 100,000 and 500,000 people.<sup>1</sup>

Importantly, this means that just under 50% of the PB cases were functioning in either small or mid-sized municipalities.

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<sup>1</sup> Brazil has 5,592 cities. However most of these cities are very small. The number of cities above 100,000 people in 2008 is 224 (4%).

A second clearly identified trend is a change in the regional profile in where PB is being adopted. There has been a de-concentration from a strong presence in the South and Southeast regions of Brazil and a growing presence in the Northeast region. Table 2 below show the incidence of P.B. experiences in Brazilian regions in the 2001-2004 administrative period and compares it with the incidence in the 2004-2008 period. Furthermore, the growth in PB in the North doubled during the 2005-2008, which is remarkable given the smaller number of municipalities in this region (verify # of municipalities per region). There was also a comparable level of growth in PB cases in the Center-West region, also with conditions of minimal growth

**Table 2**  
Percentage of P.B experiences

Regions of Brazil	Years		
	1997-2000	2001-2004	2005-2008
North	2,5%	5,5%	8,5%
Northeast	14,2%	22,6%	22,4%
South	39,2%	22,6%	21,9%
Southeast	41,7%	45,2%	41,3%
Center West	2,5%	4%	6,0%

Source: data collected from the present research

Thus, it is possible to make the following argument on incidence of P.B. experiences in Brazil in between 1997, 2004 and 2008. There is a de-concentration of experiences from the South and Southeast regions to the rest. The decrease is sharper in the South region whose number of experiences decreased by 10% from 32,9% to 22,9%. The number of experiences in the Southeast region remained almost stable concentrating 40,2% of the experiences. The most important increase has taken place in the Northeast region whose total of experiences went

from 16,45 to 21,0%. The above data point in the direction of a new equilibrium among P.B. experiences among Brazil's regions.

### 3.1 Continuation/Maintenance of PB programs

An interesting finding is the degree of continuity of PB between the 2001-2004 and 2005-2008 administrative periods. We differentiate between two kinds of continuity: the first one is between two administrations (2001-2004, 2005-2008) and the second PB continuity over three mayoral administrative periods (adding the 1997-2000 period). There are 89 cases of continuity between the 2001-2004 and the 2005-2008 mayoral periods. There are 36 cases of PB continuity between 1997-2008. What characteristics are associated with municipalities in which PB endures?

The first important characteristic of the cases of PB continuity is that these cities have socio-economic living standards that are well above the Brazil and the P.B. average. The Brazilian HDI is 0,699, and the average HDI for cities which have P.B. is 0,753. When it comes to continuity this average goes even higher reaching the gap in between 0,701 and 0,800 in 47,4% of the cases.

The population of the municipality and the municipality's region are two other factors that have a significant effect. Continuity between 2001 and 2008 was stronger in the Southeast region with 40,9% of the cases. When it comes to the second higher incidence of continuity the Northeast and the Southern regions occupy the second place with

23,6% of the cases. Table 3 below summarizes the cases of continuity according to region and size of city:

**Table 3**

Continuity between 2001-2004 and 2005-2008 mayoral periods

<b>Regions of Brazil</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Size of city</b>	<b>%</b>
North	5,6	Up to 20,000	19,1
Northeast	30,3	From 20,001 to 50,000	21,3
Center West	5,6	From 50,001 to 100,000	14,6
South	15,7	Above 100,001	39,3
Southeast	42,7	Above 100,001 and 500,000	5,6

**Source:** data collected from the research

It is possible to note two important patterns in the data on continuity: The first pattern already noted in Wampler and Avritzer (2005) work is the concentration of P.B. cases and P.B. cases of continuity in cities with socio-economic indicators above the Brazilian average. Such a fact has two explanations: the first one regarding the election of administrations whose cities rank between in the HDI cannot be explained by P.B. itself. It is the strong electoral presence of the P.T. as we will show below in these cities that may explain the implementation of P.B. there. The P.T. is elected in these cities and implements participatory budgeting there. However, the continuity issue has to be explained in a different way since administrative continuity in Brazil is

not too strong and large cities are particularly competitive.<sup>2</sup> Here the explanation of administrative success emerges as strong and P.B. is a large part of this argument. Large cities with high HDI have more likelihood of having P.B. for 8 or 12 years showing that there is a combination between strong electoral insertion of the P.T. and the administrative success of the administrations which have implemented P.B. How can we relate administrative performance to the different cases? Does design has an influence on performance?

The second pattern that emerged in the research is new and has to do with the expansion of P.B. to the Northeast region. In previous researches made on number of cases of P.B. since 1997 the Northeast region of Brazil always ranked low in terms of number of cases. In between 1997 and 2003, the Northeast region has had 14 cases of P.B. totaling 13,6% among the 103 cases (Ribeiro and Grazia, 2003). In the following administrative period in between 2001 and 2004, the Northeast region had 30 among 170 cases making up 16.4% of the total cases (Wampler and Avritzer, 2005). In the current administrations of 2004-2008 the number of cases of P.B. in the Northeast region increased to 21%. Thus, we can see a change in the regional profile of P.B. with the number of cases decreasing in the Southern region and the number of cases increasing in the Northeast of Brazil. Which kind of new institutions P.B. involve and how does it work in the Northeast. Does it have an impact in the administrative performance in the region? These are some of the question that we will seek to answer in this research report.

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<sup>2</sup> The rate of administrative continuity at the local level in Brazil is 39,4%, the number of reelected mayors in the year 2000. There is a regional variation in this number with 48,2% rate of reelection in the Northeast and 34,1% of reelections in the Southeast.

### 3.2 Regional analysis

The distribution of PB programs along regional lines is quite similar between the years of 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. When comparing the last two mayoral administrative periods, it is remarkable that the rate of adoption when analyzed along regional lines is nearly identical. The South, Southeast and Northeast are the three regions with the most significant number of PB programs. The Southeast continues to have the largest number of cases, which is due to a combination of three factors. First, the Workers' Party's base of support has traditionally been in the Southeast; the PT was an early proponent of PB, which meant that the early adoption of participatory budgeting in the Southeast was due to the party's electoral strength in the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro.

**Table 4**

Distribution of PB cases through year and region

	1997-2001	%	2001--2004	%	2005-2008	%
Center-West	3	2,5	8	4	12	6
Northeast	17	14,2	45	22,6	45	22,4
North	3	2,5	11	5,5	17	8,4
Southeast	50	41,7	90	45,2	83	41,3
South	47	39,1	45	22,7	44	21,9
<b>Total</b>	120		199		201	

Source: data collected from the research

Second, there is a state and regional diffusion effect; When municipalities in a state adopt PB, this gives neighboring municipalities governed by rival parties the opportunity to learn about PB, which then increases the likelihood that non-PT municipalities would adopt. In



other words, the electoral strength of the PT set the stage to allow their competitors to adopt this program. This phenomenon does not occur in the state of Rio de Grande do Sul, where the capital, Porto Alegre, is considered to be the birthplace of PB. In this state, PB is closely associated with the Workers' Party, which decreases the likelihood that rival parties would be willing to adopt PB. The exceptionalism of Rio de Grande do Sul suggests that many non-PT do not consider PB to be strongly associated with the PT, but that they consider it as a viable policy program.

The third reason that PB was first adopted in the Southeast is that PB programs are more likely to be adopted in municipalities with higher standards of living; the southeast of Brazil has the country's highest standard of living. Although it is impossible to establish any definitive causal relationship that links PB adoption to higher standard of living, there are several key factors including a larger number of unions, deeper support for the policy reform initiated by center and leftist parties, denser civil societies, a broader range of political strategies employed by CSOs, and greater support from high capacity NGOS.

The most significant change in where PB was adopted in Brazil occurred in the 2001-2004 mayoral administrative period as PB was adopted at higher levels in Northeast. During the 1997-2000 period, 80% of all PB cases were in the South and Southeast. By the 2001-2004 period, this dropped to 68% of the cases, which was maintained during the 2005-2008 period. Municipalities in the Northeast adopted 23% of the PB cases in the 2001-2004 period and 22% of the cases in the 2005-2008 period. What explains why PB began to be adopted in the NE?

First, there was increased knowledge about PB being disseminated by NGOs, labor unions, and political parties into the NE. Knowledge networks used workshops, seminars, and low-cost internet communications to spread information about these programs. Second, reformist mayors in major urban municipalities (Recife, Fortaleza, São Luis) adopted PB, which served as important “hubs” for the dissemination of information about PB. Third, the PT expanded its electoral base outside of the Southeast, which meant that PT municipalities were not only much more likely to adopt PB but that they would serve as new hubs that would allow for the dissemination of information and knowledge.

The spread of PB across Brazil appears to be driven by three processes. First, municipalities governed by the leftist Workers’ Party have consistently adopted PB. As the Workers’ Party map expanded, so too did the map of where PB was adopted. Second, there is a state and regional spatial diffusion effect. When key urban cities adopt PB, it serves as an important “hub”, from which information can be disseminated. Third, informal knowledge networks comprised of NGOs, CSOs, Unions, and social scientists spread information regarding how this process took place. The lack of a centralized governing systems mandating the adoption of PB worked to the benefit of PB because mayors and public officials interested in new participatory policy-making processes could avail themselves to a variety of different sources of information.

Therefore, the key lesson to be learned from the spread of PB in Brazil is that local political actors took the initiative based on their perception that PB would provide some type of benefit to their municipality. As we

consider the promotion of PB in other countries and regions, it might be useful to think about how knowledge networks, key city hubs, and a reform-oriented actor (in Brazil, the Workers' Party) contribute to increasing the likelihood that municipalities will adopt PB or policy programs based on similar principles.

### 3.3 Human Development Index

The adoption of PB was initially in municipalities with higher quality of life, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI-M). HDI scores above .800 indicate that the municipality has “High levels of Social Development,” whereas below .800 is considered to be a “medium” level of social development. Whereas only 10% of Brazil's municipalities, have HDI scores that help to categorize them as having “high level of social development, 34% of PB programs adopted between 2005-2008 have achieved this high level of social development. See Table 5 , bellow.

However, comparing PB 2005-2008 to the two previous mayoral administrative periods, we see that PB is now being adopted in a higher percentage of poorer municipalities. For the 1997-2000 period, 42% of the adopting municipalities had HDI-M scores above .800 and for the 2001-2004 period, 39% of the adopting municipalities had HDI-M scores above .800. This means that municipalities with a lower standard of living are now adopting PB. What explains this trend?

Of the 69 municipalities with a high level of social development, 94% (65) were located in the South and Southeast regions. Thus, the primary

explanation for why PB is being adopted in poor municipalities is due to the increased rates of adoption in the Northeast, North and Centerwest.

**Table 5**  
**OP 2008 HDI-M by Region**

IDH-M	Regions of Brazil					Total
	<i>Center-West</i>	<i>Northeast</i>	<i>North</i>	<i>Southeast</i>	<i>South</i>	
<b>0,500 a 0,799</b>	10	44	16	38	24	132
<b>Above 0,800</b>	2	1	1	45	20	69
<b>Total</b>	12	45	17	83	44	201

Source: data collected from the research

Seventy municipalities from the Northeast, North, and Centerwest adopted PB had “medium level HDI scores (below .799) whereas just 4 municipalities from these regions had “high” levels of social development. PB is thus being adopted in poorer municipalities due to the wider adoption of PB across Brazil.

Similarly, in the South and Southeast, those municipalities with “medium” level of social development now comprise nearly 50 % of all programs (62 of 127), which also marks a shift. Although 50% are in “high” social development communities, 50% are not, which means that governments in less wealthy municipalities are now willing to adopt PB. As a point of comparison, the average HDI score for the original 13 municipalities adopting PB was 0,806.

The usefulness of this data is that PB is now spreading into municipalities with significantly different social characteristics than the original adopting municipalities. The lesson to be drawn from the

changing conditions is two-fold. First, we should expect that innovative participatory programs such as PB program expand beyond their initial base when there is the belief that the programs are paying significant dividends for government officials, CSOs, and citizens. Second, we expect that PB programs will be modified in response to the changing socio-political environment. Government, CSOs, and citizens will want to implement different types of rules to correspond to different demands, interests, and capabilities.

### **3.4 Extreme Poverty**

Although the HDI-M helps to capture municipalities' overall standard of living, it doesn't capture how the level of deep and persistent poverty that many individuals face in Brazil. Brazil is notorious for being one of the most unequal countries in the world. Brazil has a large middle class (by the standards of the developing world), a well-paid but small unionized working class, and a small and very wealthy upper class. Local income Brazilians enjoy limited access to the material benefits produced by the world's 10<sup>th</sup> largest economy. Is there any association between the percentage of a municipality living in poverty and the adoption of PB? One of the reasons that this is important is that PB has its roots in a "pro-poor" set of policies designed to distribute greater levels of resources to the poor parts of the community.

Table 7, below, shows that 45% of Brazilian municipalities have over half their population in extreme poverty whereas 32% of the municipalities have less than 30% of their population living in extreme poverty.

**Table 7**

% of poor in Brazilian municipalities

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Up to 30%	1743	32%
from 30 a 50%	1260	23%
Above 50%	2504	45%
<b>Total</b>	5507	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

When we compare Table 7, above, to Table 8, below, several trends are noteworthy. First, just under 20% of municipalities that adopted PB had extreme poverty rates that included more than 50% of the population. In other words, municipalities with the highest percentage of its population in poverty rarely adopted PB. Of the 2504 municipalities with more than 50% living in extreme poverty, just 13 (1%) adopted PB.

The largest numbers of PB cases were adopted by municipalities that had less than a third of their population living in extreme poverty. Since 57% of the PB cases were in municipalities with lower extreme rates of poverty (they were, in some senses, overrepresented) because they made up just 32% of Brazilian municipalities.

**Table 8**PB 2008  
% of poor people

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Up to 30%	114	56,7
From 30 to 50%	48	23,9
Above 50%	39	19,4
<b>Total</b>	201	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

### 3.4.1 Change over time

There is another clear directional change between 1997 and 2008. Municipalities with a greater percentage of their population living in poverty began to adopt PB at higher rates. During the 1997-2000 period, 75% of PB municipalities had 30% or less of their population living in extreme poverty. By the 2001-2004 period, 69% had 30% or less of their population living in extreme poverty. In contrast, during the 2005-2008 period, 57% of municipalities had 30% or less of their population living in extreme poverty.

Another way to look at this same data is to consider that during the 1997-2000 period, just 7% of PB municipalities had 50% or more of their population living in extreme poverty. By the 2001-2004 period, 13% of PB municipalities had 50% or more of their population living in extreme poverty. In contrast, during the 2005-2008 period, 20% of municipalities had 50% or more of their population living in extreme poverty. Municipalities with greater and more intense poverty were adopting PB in greater numbers.

The lesson to be drawn from these cases is that mayors and CSOs interested in adopting PB are more likely to do so when there is a smaller percentage of the community living in extreme poverty. As government officials, NGOs, CSOs, and activists across the developing world contemplate where and when to promote the adoption of PB, they should consider that when Brazilian municipalities choose to adopt PB, it is generally being done in municipalities with lower than average rates of poverty.

### 3.5 Political Parties

The mayor's office and the political party who controls it are vital to the decision to adopt PB for the first time, to maintain the program if there was been a switch in parties/coalitions controlling the mayor's office, or to resurrect PB if it had fallen out of favor during a previous administration. One of the survey questions included showed that 85% of public officials contacted for this project asserted that it was the initiative of the Mayor's office. During PB's initial years, PB was strongly associated with the Workers' Party. The question that we need to answer in this section is how political party affiliation of the mayor and PB adoption has changed over time.

**Table 9**  
Political Party affiliation of the PB cases mayors

Political Party	Period					
	1997-2000		2001-2004		2005-2008	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
PC do B	--	--	1	0,5	1	.5
PDT	10	8,3	9	4,5	5	2.5
PFL	2	1,7	8	4	6	3.0
PL	--	--	2	1	2	1.0
PMDB	14	11,7	15	7,5	17	8.5
PPB	2	1,7	3	1,5	--	--
PRP	1	0,8	--	--	--	--
PRTB	1	0,8	--	--	--	--
PPS	--	--	5	2.5	7	3.5
PP	--	--	1	.5	5	2.5
PRP	--	--	--	--	1	.5
PSB	13	10,8	8	4	4	2.0
PSBD	5	4,2	--	--	--	--
PSD	1	0,8	--	--	--	--



PSDB	14	11,7	23	11,6	11	5.5
PSDC	--	--	--	--	2	
PSL	--	--	--	--	1	.5
PSTU	--	--	--	--	1	.5
PT	52	43,3	118	59,3	132	66.0
PTB	3	2,5	4	2	3	1.5
PV	2	1,7	2	1	3	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: data collected from the research

During the 1989-1996 phase, most PB programs (92% from 1989-1991 and 62% from 1992-1996) were adopted by PT governments. This decreased during the 1997-2000 for two reasons. First, the 1996 elections were particularly bad for the PT—they lost in many of their traditional strongholds and were unable to expand their base of support. Second, many non-PT governments were willing to adopt PB during the 1997-2000 due to the wide-spread belief that the most successful PB programs in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte were providing policy and electoral dividends for the government. Although it seemed that the association between PB and the PT was weakening, the evidence between 2001 and 2008 suggests that there is still a strong connection between the Workers' Party and the adoption of PB. During the 2005-2008 period, two-thirds of all PB cases were being administered by the Workers' Party. If we include two parties affiliated with the PT, the PMDB and PSB, over 75% of all programs are administered by the PT and their close allies. What do we make of this evidence? Mayors and public officials associated with the PT continue to adopt PB because it corresponds to their core political and policy agendas. It appears that a political agent (the PT), with ties to CSOs and conditioned by electoral incentives, is integral to the spread of PB in Brazil. The question for

activists and policymakers in other countries is to identify what types of organizations might be able to act as a dissemination agent. Obviously, political parties similar to the PT would be ideal candidates but NGOs, IFIs, and other types of political parties could also serve this role.

### 3.6 Continuity

#### 3.6.1 Two terms

The rate of continuity between PB programs from the 2001-2004 and the 2005-2008 period is high, 61%. What are the key characteristics of the continuity? First, we note that the continuity rate across the five regions is comparable to the rates that each region adopted PB. In other words, region is on a factor that significantly affects continuity of PB. Second, as the population of city increases, there is a greater likelihood that PB programs will continue across mayoral administrative periods. Forty-five percent of the continuity occurred in cases with more than 50,000 residents, slightly larger than the 41% share of PB cases during the 2005-2008 period. Third, did the 2004 election outcome affect the likelihood of continuity? In other words, how many of the case of PB were maintained when there was a change in the political party controlling the electoral office.

Fourth, there is no clear pattern that links municipalities' standard of living and the likelihood of adopting PB. Fifty-nine municipalities with "medium" levels of social development continued whereas 30 of the "high" social development. Although there are greater absolute numbers of "medium" municipalities that continued PB across the two municipal periods, medium municipalities did so at a 45% rate and

“high” municipalities did so at a 43% rate. This suggests that factors other than social economic levels help to explain social development.

Finally, how does the 45% continuity rate compare to earlier periods? What was the continuity rate in 2001-2004?

### 3.6.2 Three terms

Importantly, there were 36 municipalities using PB since 1997. This suggests that once PB programs are adopted by a municipal government that are increasingly better odds that the program will become part of the municipality’s decision-making process. This doesn’t tell us much about how these programs will function that they suggest that governments and citizens are increasingly growing accustomed to the idea that budgetary processes should be transparent, open to the public, deliberative and participatory.

What account for the continuity across 3 mayoral administrative periods:

Sixty-seven percent of the 3-terms continuity occurred in municipalities with more than 100,000 residents although this group made up just 41% of the municipalities within PB in 2005-2008.

With regard to the association between HDI and 3-term continuity, there was a relatively higher percentage of “high” social development municipalities that had PB over the 12 year period. The most reasonable explanation is that there were a greater number of “high” social

development municipalities during the 1997-2000 period, thus making it more likely that more of these municipalities would produce PB programs that functioned between 1997-2000. This is additional evidence that municipalities' standard of living is not directly correlated to the likelihood that their PB programs would continue across several mayoral administrations.

### **3.7 The design of P.B. experiences 2005-2008 experiences and administrative responsibility**

Participatory budgeting, as it has been showed above, emerged with a specific design that resembled very much particular conditions of the city of Porto Alegre. Elements of this design such as regional meetings and the implementation of a special administrative institution in charge of P.B. were key to the success of P.B. in Porto Alegre. We also know that there has been variation in the organization of P.B. though it is not clear how these variations affect the most successful experiences. In order to better understand the relationship between design and outcomes, we administered the survey to 160 cities in two questions that were geared toward unraveling this puzzle:<sup>3</sup> 1) which are the elements that P.B. takes into account to distribute public goods in your city; 2) where is P.B. located in your city administrative organization? These two questions are very important to figure out the role elements of design may play in the success or failure of the experience. Table 4 below summarizes the most important element that cities take into account to distribute public goods. The first data that it is important to

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<sup>3</sup> Of the 201 identified cases of PB, our research teams were able to successfully administration the survey in 160 cases, a response rate of 80 percent.

find out is the importance of lack of access to previous goods and the participation of social actors in the process. In 20% of the 160 cases, lack of access to public goods was the key element in the organization of P.B. and in 25% social participation was the key element in the access to public goods. It is also possible to aggregate to lack of access to public goods the data on infra-structure and to point out that in 32,5% either lack of previous access to public goods and lack of infra-structure were the main criteria to get public works in P.B.

**Table 10**

PB 2008  
P.B.s' priorities for the distribution of resources

	Frequency	%
The poorness of regions	32	20,0
Infra-structure	20	12,5
Social Policy	21	13,1
Participation	40	25,0
Demographic density	5	3,1
Other	38	23,8
DK	3	1,9
DA	1	,6
<b>Total</b>	160	100,0

Source: data collected from the research

However, it is very interesting to see the cases of continuity which are the most successful cases of P.B. that more objective criteria assumes a greater role in the decision making process. In that case lack of previous access to public goods goes up to 23,1% among the 62 cases of continuity of P.B. between 2001 and 2008. If we add to lack of access the existing infra-structure it goes up to 35,3%. At the same time, participation decreases to 23,1%. Thus, drawing on the cases of continuity that we assume are the most successful shows that technical criteria assume a relatively higher role vis-à-vis participation.

The issue of design also assumes relevance in a second question, namely where within the administration P.B. is located. As we pointed out above, this was an important issue in the process of consolidation of P.B. in Porto Alegre since its direct link to the mayor cabinet expedited the implementation of P.B. and relieved P.B. from many administrative conflicts (Avritzer, 2002b). We asked the 160 cities interviewed in the survey where P.B. is located. In the majority of the cases the so-called “Porto Alegre model” prevailed with 56 cases representing 35% of the sample. 23,8% also pointed out a direct link with the planning secretary, a administrative format that we know does not make P.B. very strong in the administration (see table 5 below). As we looked into the cases of continuity it became clear that the direct subordination of P.B. to the executive is the most successful format with 46% of the experiences of P.B. with at least 8 years assuming this institutional design. Thus, again we see the importance of design in the success of P.B. experiences. The most successful design shows a higher incidence in continuity experience than it showed in the experience taking place in between 2004 and 2008.

**Table 11**

In which place in the administration P.B. is located

	<b>PB 2008</b>		<b>Continuity 1997-2008</b>		<b>Continuity 2001-2008</b>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
Planning Secretary	52	32,5	13	38,2	19	29,2
Works Secretary	3	1,9	1	2,9	2	3,1
Finances / Accounting Secretary	19	11,9	3	8,8	6	9,2
Sector directly subordinated to the Executive	58	36,3	7	20,6	30	46,2
P.B. Secretary	7	4,4	4	11,8	2	3,1
Secretary of administration	13	8,1	4	11,8	3	4,6

Other	8	5,0	2	5,9	3	4,6
<b>Total</b>	160	100,0	34	100,0	65	100,0

Source: data collected from the research

The other design questions were relative to the routine of P.B. and how much it departed from the original experiences. We made three additional questions: the first one was “does P.B. involve regional or thematic meetings?”; The second question was “what is the cycle of P.B. in your city?” and the third was “is there a P.B. council in your city?”

The result of the first question on thematic meeting is an interesting result that allows us to separate P.B. successful experiences from the Porto Alegre case. It is important to discuss the emergence of these two kinds of meetings before analyzing the results. Regional meetings emerged together with P.B. based on a demand of social movement in Porto Alegre since the early 80's. They proved to be the key institution in involving the population in the decision-making process on public works (Avritzer, 2002b; Navarro,1998). Thematic meeting emerged as a solution to the lack of citywide policies produced by P.B. in Porto Alegre, a city in which 100% of the city investments were made through participatory budgeting (Navarro,1998;Baiocchi,2005). However, as P.B. expanded to other cities in Brazil most of them adapted this element and integrated P.B. with different forms of carrying out city investments. We wanted to know how the difference between the specific policies which emerged in Porto Alegre and the specific realities of other cities expressed itself through the presence of regional and thematic meeting. The answer is very interesting (see table

6 below). In 88,2% of the cases there are regional meetings with only 11,8% of the cases declaring that these meetings did not exist. However, when it comes to thematic meetings, they do not take place in 52,5% of the cases.

**Table 12**  
Existence of regional meetings

	<b>PB 2008</b>		<b>Continuity 1997-2008</b>		<b>Continuity 2001-2008</b>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
Yes	141	88,1	30	88,2	62	95,4
No	19	11,9	4	11,8	3	4,6
<b>Total</b>	160	100,0	34	100,0	65	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

It is possible to make two different kinds of arguments on the presence of regional meetings and on the lack of thematic meetings. The first argument is about regional meetings. The overwhelmingly presence in experiences of P.B. across Brazil shows that it is the key design for the success of participatory budgeting. The second argument is about the low presence of thematic meetings in experiences of P.B. It shows that these meetings followed the logics of Porto Alegre's politics and did not aggregate quality to P.B.'s deliberative process.

The other two questions on the P.B. cycle and on the presence of P.B. council on the municipal level also added to our knowledge on P.B. The idea of implementing P.B. on a yearly basis followed closely the logics of the budget process in Brazil. P.B. was made on an annual basis in Porto Alegre and later in Belo Horizonte, São Paulo and Recife, the main cities in Brazil that implemented participatory budgeting.



However, at the same time that P.B. was implemented yearly, emerged problems regarding the fulfillment of the decisions in one year. Even in the case of Porto Alegre most of the deliberations were fulfilled during the whole administrative period (4 years) most of the time due to the problem related to the bidding process. These problems were even more serious in the case of cities like São Paulo and Belo Horizonte. The answer on the timing of P.B. cycle shows indications of cities trying to move away from the year cycle though its remains overwhelmingly among the 160 cases in which the questionnaire was applied (see table 7):

**Table 13**

PB 2008

What's the timing of P.B. cycle in your city ?

	Frequency	%
Quarterly	1	,6
Annual	137	85,6
Biennial	16	10,0
Triennial	3	1,9
Quadriennial	3	1,9
<b>Total</b>	160	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

It is important to see the characteristics of the cities that have transformed P.B. into a bi-annual form of budget making. Important cities, such as Belo Horizonte, Santo Andre, Contagem, Niteroi and Vitória da Conquista switched a bi-annual P.B. The cities have an important weight in the elaboration of P.B. they are regional references, they have large populations and in some cases such as Belo Horizonte, Santo Andre and Vitória da Conquista they are references in their own

states. They may anticipate long term trends due to the way they are adapting P.B. to a more reasonable administrative cycle.

The last important design question that we asked is related to the presence of P.B. council in these cities. P.B. council in the most important experiences of P.B. emerged as the key institution for the aggregation of demands and for the budget negotiation with the city administration. Among the largest cities and the most important experiences of P.B. only Belo Horizonte did not introduce a council (Avritzer, 2006). The composition of P.B. council was defined in this political process of the city of Porto Alegre. In Porto Alegre P.B. council was composed by representatives of the regions, most of the time people linked to neighborhood associations. A few representatives of trade unions were also present. We will see that both the presence of P.B. council and the format have been maintained in most of the cases.

The answers to the questionnaires confirmed that the majority of the cases have a P.B. council as table 8 below shows. 56,9% of the experiences have a P.B. council whereas 43,1% do not have one. It is important to make a few remarks about the cities which do not have a P.B. council. There is a resistance among many administrations in accepting the presence of a council constituted by participatory budgeting participants. The council may create tension with other sectors of the administration. It also may be seen as a competitor of the city council (Dias, 2000).

**Table 14**  
PB 2008  
Existence of P.B. Municipal Council

	PB 2008		Continuity 1997-2008		Continuity 2001-2008	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
Yes	91	56,9	16	47,1	44	67,7
No	69	43,1	18	52,9	21	32,3
<b>Total</b>	160	100,0	34	100,0	65	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

However, the experience of the most successful cases of P.B. studies (Avritzer, 2002b; 2009; Wampler, 2008; Baiocchi, 2005; Silva, 2002) shows the need for a council. Without a council, participatory budgeting is transformed into a method for the gathering of public demands without the process of negotiation, empowerment and bargaining that is has been known for and which has an important democratizing effect. The cases of continuity between 2001 and 2008 strongly confirm this position. In 67,7% of the cases of continuity there is a P.B. council. When it comes to the composition of P.B. we can also see that there is not much variation in relation to the original cases, as table 14 below shows: civil society is present in the 100% of the cases in which there is a P.B. council. Interesting enough, the variation when it is present takes place is present in the representation of government. Government is less present in P.B. councils than civil society representatives and 27,5% of the cases do not involve the presence of government.

**Table 15**  
PB 2008  
Composition of P.B. council

	<b>Civil Society</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Labour Unions</b>	<b>%</b>
Yes	91	100,0	66	72,5	28	30,8
No	0	,0	25	27,5	62	68,1
DK	0	,0	0	,0	1	1,1
<b>Total</b>	91	100,0	91	100,0	91	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

Finally, it is important to have in mind which public goods P.B. deals. Again, it is important to point out how this issue emerged in the most important experiences of P.B. and how it evolved. P.B. emerged in Porto Alegre as a form of distribution of 11 different types of public goods. However, as P.B. evolved in the city it became clear the concentration of P.B. expenses in the area of infra-structure with focus on pavement and sewage. In 1999, among the 16 regions of Porto Alegre, all regions had concentrated their first and second priorities in three infra-structure goods, pavement, sewage and basic urban infra-structure (Avritzer, 2002b:42). The expansion of P.B. followed a very similar logic. In the case of Belo Horizonte almost all claims were also concentrated in infra-structure in the first years of P.B. (Avritzer, 2006). Thus, P.B. became consolidated as a form of distribution of infra-structure services in most of the cases. In our questionnaire, we asked on which kind of good and services P.B. focused. 83,1% of the responses were that P.B. focused on specific infra-structure works, such as sewage and pavement. 16,9% of the respondents point out that P.B. went beyond infra-structure works and involved general budgetary issues in the city. When we looked to the cases of continuity the available data did not change very much with 15,4% of the respondents

claiming that general fiscal issues were important in the city P.B. It is possible to point out to the overwhelming majority of the cases of P.B. are about infra-structure works.

**Table 16**

PB 2008

Thematic PB decisions are most likely to be linked to

	Frequency	%
General budgeting issues	27	16,9
Investments in specific policies	133	83,1
<b>Total</b>	160	100,0

**Source:** data collected from the research

It is possible to make a general remark on the data on P.B. design presented above. This points in the direction that there are general elements of design which emerged during the most important experiences of P.B. and still are present in the experiences of continuity of P.B. The questionnaires applied showed that regional meetings, criteria on the lack of previous access to public goods and the presence of a council are the most important design elements present in most of the experiences. In addition to that we found a stronger presence of these elements in the experiences of continuity of P.B. for more than one administration. At the same time, the answers to the questionnaires also made clear that some of the designs also obeyed the logics of Porto Alegre politics and could not be extended to other experiences. This was the case of thematic meetings. And last, but not least a few new institutional formats have just been introduced and may imply in important changes in P.B.: the most important among these devices is

bi-annual P.B. cycles that as we pointed out above are being practiced by key cities such as Belo Horizonte, Vitoria da Conquista and Santo Andre. In the concluding remarks to these report we will come back to these issues and relate them with the data on the socio-economic performance of cities with P.B.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS: DESIGN AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF P.B. CITIES**

Four major conclusions of the expansion of participatory budgeting in Brazil are possible to be pointed out based on the 201 cases of P.B. identified and analyzed and on 160 cases of P.B. on which we produced data.

The first major conclusion is about regional incidence of P.B. P.B. emerged in the city of Porto Alegre and has had a strong incidence in the Southern region of Brazil with the concentration of 39,2% of the experiences in between 1997 and 2000. The strong presence of P.B. in the south of Brazil has had two explanations: the first one is linked to the origins of P.B. in Porto Alegre and its rapid expansion of the city's metropolitan region and later expansion of important cities of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, such as Caxias do Sul. The strong presence of P.B. in the south of Brazil posed problems to the likely universalization of P.B. After all, the Southern region of Brazil diverts in terms of HDI, political culture and levels of poverty from the other regions of the country. The data found in this research points towards a "normalization" of P.B. profile with little change in the Southeast of Brazil and a sharp increase in the other regions. P.B. expanded to the Northeast region with the increase in the incidence of cases from 14,2% to 22.45 of the cases. This is close to the average presence of Northeast municipalities in Brazil. This expansion shows that P.B. may play the role in the near future of helping municipalities with lower HDI (for the Brazilian average) to deal with infra-structure and poverty issues. It also creates an overlapping in terms of public policy issues between the

cases of P.B. in Brazil and other cities in Latin America and Africa where P.B. is being introduced right now.

The second major conclusion is related to HDI and poverty alleviation. P.B. emerged in a city, Porto Alegre which ranks well in per capita income but whose main achievement is to have a relative position in HDI above its per capita income position. This strong presence of P.B. in cities which rank well in HDI became on the trademarks of P.B. programs. In spite of the decrease of P.B. presence in the South of Brazil and the increase of P.B. in cities of the Northeast, P.B. still has an HDI above the region's and Brazil's average, as table 16 below shows:

**Table 17**

Comparison of HDI averages

	<b>Brazil General</b>	<b>PB 2008</b>	<b>Northeast General</b>	<b>PB 2008 Northeast cases</b>
<b>HDI average</b>	0,699	0,753	0,610	0,678

**Source:** data collected from the research

As seen, in comparison to Brazil's average, PB 2008 cases rank higher in HDI average. In this same way, when we focus the attention on the Northeast region, it is possible to note that the "new" cases spreading out throughout the region do tend to follow the same pattern, ranking very close to Brazil's average and above the Northeast region average.

The third important conclusion is related to design. P.B. assumed a double condition *vis-a-vis* the design of the participatory process. On



the one hand, it assumed a kind of design which fitted to the overall organization of social activities in the city of Porto Alegre. Institutions such as regional meeting, thematic meetings, P.B. council, annual budget cycle and GAPLAN all emerged in this process. As P.B. expanded beyond Porto Alegre some of these institutions confirmed their centrality within a participatory budgeting process whereas other institutions proved to be locally bounded. In this research we adopted two methods to figure out the centrality of these institutions in P.B. We searched on their presence in cases of P.B. and in the cases of continuity. Table 17 bellow summarizes well the institutions that are central to the existence of P.B. They are: regional meetings, PB council, the representation of civil society in P.B. council and the focus on the budgeting process on infra-structure issues.

**Table 18**  
P.B. key institutions

	<b>PB 2008</b>	<b>Continuity 2001-2008</b>
	<i>% of cases</i>	<i>% of cases</i>
Existence of regional meetings	88,1	95,4
Existence of PB Council	56,9	67,7
Representation of Civil Society in PB Council	100	100
Focus on infrastructure issues	83,1	83,8

**Source:** data collected from the research

We also found that actors attributed a lower importance to thematic meeting and to discussion of fiscal issues on P.B. meetings. We can, thus, point out that it is important in processes of expansion of P.B. to

differentiate elements that belong to political characteristics of the original experiences and elements that have been validated at the more general level. Three main designs have been validated at the more general level, regional meetings, PB council with civil society participation and bounding P.B. to infra-structure investments.

The last issue to be discussed relates to new institutional features added to P.B. We have analyzed several new institutional devices added to P.B. the most important among them the adaptation of the annual cycle. We also analyzed the introduction of fiscal debates and the transformation of P.B. in consultative. Only the first proved itself an important device, though it still not employed by the majority of the P.B. cities. However, the centrality of the cities that introduced biannual P.B. cycles point in the direction of the importance of introducing new devices that may adapt P.B. to different realities. As a general conclusion, it is important to point out that P.B. overcame the charge of being a workers Party device and has come to age. Its expansion to the Northeast of Brazil and its long term presence in high HDI cities shows the importance of employing it to make public policies more consistent.

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